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TｴW けゲデﾗヴ┞ｷﾐｪげ ﾗa ヴｷゲﾆ ｷゲ ;ﾐ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ ;ﾐS ﾐWｪﾉWIデWS SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ けﾐ┌IﾉW;ヴ 
I;デ;ゲデヴﾗヮｴｷゲﾏげ ｴ;┗W ヮﾗ┘Wヴa┌ﾉﾉ┞ aヴ;ﾏWS experience and acquired considerable independence, with 
け┘ｴ;デ ﾏｷｪｴデ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐげ HWIﾗﾏｷﾐｪ ;ゲ ヴW;ﾉ ;ゲ ┘ｴ;デ ;Iデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ SｷSく This article builds upon limited earlier 
risk narrative research, focusing upon their historical development in the US and UK. Analysis 
proceeds from an understanding of risk as a tool that brings together an understanding of threats, 
what is threatened and how that might be remedied in the future, increasingly based upon past 
experience. Risk narratives emerge historically with the growth of concern for the public impact of 
environmental events, through individuals recognising these in secular terms, prepared to warn 
others and, later, challenge denial of institutional responsibility. But the explicit language of 
environmental risk only emerges in post-war America through public challenges to fluoridation, 
pesticides and consumer safety, the article arguing デｴ;デ ┘W I;ﾐ ;ヮヮヴﾗ┝ｷﾏ;デWﾉ┞ Sｷゲデｷﾐｪ┌ｷゲｴ けヴｷゲﾆ 
ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS ┘ｷデｴ ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ-made threat and an assumption of corporate and 
institutional responsibility, focused upon victims and blame for their condition. This singular focus 
can be problematic in its impact upon victims themselves in the case of nuclear catastrophism, 
however. A concluding suggestion is that If narrative is to be used in risk communication it will 
require more sophisticated forms that go beyond only exposing risk, insisting upon blame and 
inferring limitless harm.  
Key words: environment, risk, narrative, blame, history 
 
Background, Framing and Definitions 
Environmental risk narratives are the terms in which we describe what has happened around us, 
whether it could happen again and what might be done about it. They are accounts, involving an 
identification of the cause of environmental impacts, who might be affected in future and how this 
might be avoided, woven in often evocative narrative terms.  They are also distinct from a simple 
recording of events; not only in the banal sense that literary and journalistic accounts are inevitably 
dramatized and subjective. Rather, events are consistently framed in distinct, even curious ways, 
where those that affirm narrative bias are selected for attention, whilst complexity and 
contradictory evidence are ignored.  
To an extent, narratives are necessary to order experience and expectations, and are from exclusive 
to discussions of risk. And they can be heightened and become particularly impervious to change 
under different circumstances. Take an everyday example of the storying of a UK sports Iﾉ┌Hゲげ 
fortunes. Liverpool football club is a once successful けa;ﾉﾉWﾐ ｪｷ;ﾐデげ that has struggled to excel in the 
new era of Premiership soccer. Yet, expectations remain high amongst a demanding mass fan base 
who now voice their frustrations through social media and are conditioned to expect only another 
けa;ﾉゲW S;┘ﾐげ W┗Wﾐ ｷa デｴW デW;ﾏ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏゲ HWデデWヴ - as it began to do under a new manager from 2016. 
Improvement was unsurprisingly gradual, however, and focus developed upon an - initially partly 
true - perception of a team that was excellent at attacking, but defensively poor. As one record of 
デｴW デW;ﾏげゲ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ｷﾉﾉ┌ゲデヴ;デWゲが W┗Wﾐ ;ゲ デｴW they continued to dramatically improve into 2018, 
any goals (that are inevitably conceded by any team) continued to be held up as evidence of the 
fundamental truth of the narrative and the need to get rid of the club owners, in the absence of 
unrealistic total dominance (Tomkins 2018).   
2 
 
Concerns about environmental risk are at least as charged as sporting hopes and passions. A 
fundamentally different way of thinking about the world informs the public/expert divide in 
assessing environmental risk that renders more objective knowledge and assessment often 
irrelevant (Margolis 1996). The stories we tell ourselves about what might happen are constructed 
not only from available information, but in the context of psychological biases and fears, social 
uncertainty about who and what can be trusted and a political sense of whether future outcomes 
could be made different. In the most e┝デヴWﾏW I;ゲWゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ けﾐ┌IﾉW;ヴ I;デ;ゲデヴﾗヮｴｷゲﾏげ, discussed 
further below, a powerful story of near disaster and imagined consequences can establish itself as 
the truth despite a lack of evidence, and remain impervious to it even over time.  
Narratives can play an active role in making sense of experience and allocating blame when they put 
prevailing norms and anxieties into effective words and frames. This article sets out to place this 
development in historical context, allowing a specific appreciation of their changing nature and 
potential impact. Whilst we can identify continuity in the characteristics of environmental risk 
narratives from their beginnings in early modern England, there is also considerable change in their 
focus and implications, as impacts tend to be over rather than under-stated, and victims and blame 
for their plight predominatesく Iﾐ ゲｴﾗヴデが デｴW ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wゲ ﾗa デｴW けヴｷゲﾆ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ ;ヴW a┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉﾉ┞ SｷaaWヴWﾐデ 
to their predecessors, despite sharing general characteristics of making sense of disaster and 
warning of its potential recurrence. 
This introduction sets out definitions and some intellectual background, including the related fields 
of framing and stigmatization. The article then proceeds chronologically, beginning with the absence 
of narrative in ancient Roman accounts of environmental events. It then moves forward through 18th 
century beginnings, the development of more critical responses in the 19th and early 20th Century, 
aﾐS デｴW a┌ﾉﾉ WﾏWヴｪWﾐIW ﾗa けヴｷゲﾆ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ デ┞ヮW ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wゲが デﾗ デﾗS;┞く Considering such a time span 
within limited space involves schematic rather then systematic treatment and the reader will have to 
forgive the significant historical leaps! 
    ......................................... 
It is in the context of better communicating risk to the public that interest in narrative has recently 
developed, drawing upon the popularity of narrative story telling as a means of popular science 
communication - such as to explain natural selection (e.g. Prins, Avraamidou and Goedhart 2017). 
There is a practical implication that the storying of experience may ｴWﾉヮ ┌ゲ デﾗ けSW;ﾉ HWデデWヴ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW 
┌ﾐW┝ヮWIデWSげ, and this journal special issue originates in this hope (Eidinow 2018). This contribution 
aims to critically situate narratives through an historical perspective that allows an appreciation of 
their different characters and implications に despite their formal similarities. 
The study of narrative has long been important in the humanities, though what is perceived as a 
macro-theorising theme of risk has been left to sociologists like Beck (Martin 2012). The storying of 
experience is also central to narrative psychology, including around events such as 9/11 (Schiff, 
McKim and Patron 2017). But there has been very little social research on risk narrative as such, with 
only one scholar directly developing the theme, Gaspar Mairal (e.g. 2011), and a few recent studies 
engaging it in relation to risk communication (Fuentes and Fuentes 2015; Sellnow et al 2018). A 
significant barrier are the methodological difficulties of researching narrative in the more rigorous 
manner expected in social science. Only recently has sociological risk research begun to explore 
ways of mapping narrative both more quantitatively and contextually, in collaboration with socio-
linguistics (Zinn and Macdonald 2018).  
Whilst there is a great deal of risk research on the role of media and communication, common focus 
is ┌ヮﾗﾐ デｴW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ﾗa けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾏヮﾉｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐげ and whether it has occurred, or not (e.g. Pidgeon et al 
1992). Where attention has been paid to the nature, linkages and impact of messages is in relation 
to framing and stigmatization, and both are important to, and inseparable from, any reflection on 
risk narrative, which concerns the terms in which the public are made aware of events and their 
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IﾗﾐゲWケ┌WﾐIWゲく N;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ;ﾐS aヴ;ﾏｷﾐｪ ;ヴW ┌ゲWS ｷﾐデWヴIｴ;ﾐｪW;Hﾉ┞ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ｷﾐ デｴW ゲデ┌S┞ ﾗa けIﾉｷﾏ;デW-ｪ;デWげ 
by Nerlich (2015). Allan, Anderson and Petersen (2010: 44) note that the concept of framing けｷゲ HWｷﾐｪ 
ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪﾉ┞ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷゲWS ;ゲ ; ┌ゲWa┌ﾉ ﾏW;ﾐゲ ﾗa Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲｷﾐｪぐデｴW ﾐW┘ゲ ヴWヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ ﾗa ゲIｷWﾐIW ;ﾐS ヴｷゲﾆげが 
;ﾐS SWaｷﾐWS ;ゲ ; けSｷゲI┌ヴゲｷ┗W ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ┌デｷﾉｷゲWS H┞ ﾃﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉｷゲデゲ デﾗ SWaｷﾐW デｴW ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa ; ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ W┗Wﾐデくげ 
Frames can alternate and compete. Hargreaves, Lewis and Speers (2003) note two contrasting forms 
ｷﾐ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ｪWﾐWデｷI デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲぎ WｷデｴWヴ デｴW ﾐWｪ;デｷ┗Wが ｴ┌HヴｷゲデｷI けデ;ﾏヮWヴｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ ﾐ;デ┌ヴWげ デｴ;デ ﾏ┌ゲデ 
inevitably けend in disasterげ aﾗヴﾏき ﾗヴ デｴW けHﾗﾉS W┝ヮWヴｷﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲcientists prepared to do the 
┌ﾐデｴｷﾐﾆ;HﾉW ;ﾐS ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ aｷﾐS I┌ヴWゲ aﾗヴ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ┘W ;IIWヮデ ;ゲ ｷﾐI┌ヴ;HﾉWげ frame. Whilst closely 
IﾗﾐﾐWIデWSが ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗Wゲ ﾏﾗヴW ゲヮWIｷaｷI aﾗI┌ゲ ┌ヮﾗﾐ ┘ﾗヴSゲが けゲデﾗヴ┞げ ;ﾐS デｴW IﾗﾐﾐWIデｷﾗﾐゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ 
the different objects and subjects involved, as in narrative analysis more broadly.  
A risk and blame frame prioritises identifying responsibility and demands redress and is particularly 
relevant to contemporary risk narratives, based upon recognition that in its contemporary form risk 
language concerns the contested allocation of responsibility (Douglas 1994). It has been employed in 
relation to various issues, from vaccination (Holton et al 2012) to climate change (Freeman 2017). 
The consequences of such framing can be the establishment of environmental risk stigma, defined as 
; けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ﾗa SｷゲIヴWSｷデｷﾐｪ ゲWデデｷﾐｪゲが ヮﾉ;IWゲが ﾗHﾃWIデゲが ﾐﾗﾐ-human lifeforms and surroundings, as well as 
ヮWﾗヮﾉW ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デWS ┘ｷデｴ デｴWゲW Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデゲげ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ; ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ﾗa ﾏWデ;ヮｴﾗヴｷI;ﾉ けIﾗﾐデ;ﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげ 
(Edelstein 2001: 49). Radiation stigma is among the most powerful.  
Reflecting on framing, stigma and narrative involves understanding risk as an idea rather than ; けH;Sげ 
or potentially damaging thing (definitionally a hazard). Risk is a secular conception of what might 
happen in the future, informed by what happened in the past and the chance of its recurrence. In 
デｴW デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa M;ｷヴ;ﾉ ふヲヰヱヱぎ ヴヲぶぎ けヴｷゲﾆ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ ; a;Iデが ｷデ ｷゲ ヴ;デｴWヴ ;ﾐ ;ヴデWa;Iデが ; デﾗﾗﾉ デｴ;デ ｷゲ ┌ゲWS デﾗ Hヴｷﾐｪ 
together objects, facts, events or any other entities which can produce harm and others which can 
HW ｴ;ヴﾏWSげく Wｴｷﾉゲデ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;デｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ ｷSW;ゲ ﾗa ヮヴﾗH;Hｷﾉｷデ┞が デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW aヴ;ﾏｷﾐｪ ﾗa W┗Wﾐデゲ ｷﾐ ﾃﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉゲ ;ﾐS 
ﾐW┘ゲヮ;ヮWヴゲが ;ﾐぎ けW┝ヮWヴデ IﾗﾐIWヮデくくくIヴﾗゲゲWS ﾗ┗Wヴ ｷﾐデﾗ デｴW I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲヮｴWヴW デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wが ┘ｴｷIｴ 
spread デｴW ｷSW; ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ ; ヮヴﾗｪヴWゲゲｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ┘ｷSWヴ ヮ┌HﾉｷIげ, ;ゲ デｴW a┌デ┌ヴW けｴ;ゲ デ;ﾆWﾐ ゲｴ;ヮW デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW ┌ゲW 
ﾗa SｷaaWヴWﾐデ ﾃﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉｷゲデｷI ゲデ┞ﾉWゲげ (Mairal 2011: 65). Risk stories then link a series of events, give 
ﾏW;ﾐｷﾐｪ デﾗ デｴWﾏ ;ﾐS デｴWヴWH┞ Wゲデ;Hﾉｷゲｴ けゲWﾏ;ﾐデｷI ﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆゲ Iﾗﾏヮヴising objects at risk, risk objects, 
;ﾐS ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ ﾗa ヴｷゲﾆげ ふBﾗｴﾗﾉﾏ ;ﾐS Cﾗヴ┗WﾉﾉWI ヲヰヱヱぎ ヱΒヵぶく They remain distinct from other 
narratives in their implicit or explicit claim to be based upon what has verifiably happened and the 
chances of wider impact and recurrence. As warnings to others, they are also intended to make a 
public impact and modify how we think about a problem and its urgency. 
Ideas of risk first become institutionalised through the threat posed by sea travel, with marine 
insurance, and narrative developed alongside. The prospect and spectacle of shipwreck has provided 
; けﾏWデ;ヮｴﾗヴ aﾗヴ W┝ｷゲデWﾐIWげ aヴﾗﾏ ;ﾐIｷWﾐデ GヴWWﾆ デｷﾏWゲ ふBﾉ┌ﾏWﾐHWヴｪ ヱΓΓヶぶく Seafaring sharply posed a 
danger to be managed for the Ancients in a way that their lack of control over life more generally did 
not, and they characteristically did this by encouraging fortune through repeating rituals associated 
with previous successful journeys. A risk perspective requires a more open-ended, secular and 
human-centred sense of the future than was characteristic of the pre-modern world, where fate 
predominated. In general terms, understanding and managing risk explicitly only emerges in early 
modern times, particularly through sea exploration and trade. Seafarers began to take more 
calculated risks. Mairal (2011) describes Christopher Columbus using the term in relation to the 
crossing of the Atlantic, where the けobjects of riskげ are the sea and pirates, and the けobject at riskげ the 
cargo. Through the journey the two become linked naヴヴ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞が ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌Iｷﾐｪ デｴﾗゲW け;デ ヴｷゲﾆげ ;ﾐS ｷデゲ 
nature; here the monarchs funding the journey.  
The more open-ended sense of possibility involved in risk narratives is central, with the future no 
longer being fatalistically fixed ;ゲ け;Iデゲ ﾗa ｪﾗSゲげ. Narrative then takes on significance as a means of 
warnings that might prevent or limit negative outcomes, without relying only upon fate and fortune. 
Characteristically, environmental risk narratives are public narratives oriented towards warning 
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some section of the population of possible harms. Mairal (2011: 72) draws out an understanding of 
risk narrative as communicating evidence-H;ゲWS IﾗﾐデｷﾐｪWﾐデ ｴ;ヴﾏ ┘ｴWヴWH┞が けくくくW┗Wﾐデゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ 
happened before are turned into a lesson to be learnedくげ  
As well as understanding risk in general, stigmatization and blame framing this study is also situated 
ｷﾐ ｷSW;ゲ ﾗa デｴW けヴｷゲﾆ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ ;ﾐS デｴW ﾉWゲゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ けﾗデｴWヴ ゲｷSWげ ﾗa BWIﾆげゲ ゲﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴが 
individualization (Burgess 2018). BWIﾆげゲ (1992) influential thesis postulated a sense of global risks 
presenting unprecedented threat and was part of に and made popular following に the catastrophist 
framing of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. It reflects the sense that science and official institutions 
are not only unable to now manage risk but part of the problem of blind, uncontrolled technological 
development. The heightened perception of risk is also rooted in a secular process of 
individualization based on the dissolution of traditional bonds, ties and assumptions, leaving the 
individual to map their own way through the uncertainty left in its wake. A consequence is 
increasing victim-centredness and demands for the determination of culpability evident in reactions 
to environmental events, but also in other spheres such as crime and the introduction of the charge 
of corporate manslaughter in English law in 2007, for example (Garland 2002). Having set out some 
of the intellectual background, the article now moves on to establish the very different terms in 
which environmental events can be understood in different contexts, and then proceeds to provide 
a sketch of their historical development. 
 
Early Warnings, to Accounting for Public Tragedy 
‘ｷゲﾆ ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wゲ ;ヴW ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ ;ﾐS ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ ヮｴWﾐﾗﾏWﾐﾗﾐ デｴ;デ WﾏWヴｪW ;ゲ ; けﾏﾗSWヴﾐげ ┘;┞ ﾗa ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ 
sense of the world around us, especially negative impacts. It is not the nature or even the scale of 
events in themselves that determine the terms in which they will be understood but prevailing 
norms and wider context, and whether and how authority is held to account and the prospects of 
redress and change among other factors. Environmental protest in Russia under Putin in the late 
2010s, for example, shares the insistence upon blame characteristic of contemporary risk narrative, 
but the aﾗI┌ゲ ｷゲ ┌ヮﾗﾐ Iﾗヴヴ┌ヮデ ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉゲく P┌デｷﾐげゲ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ｷﾏヮヴWｪﾐ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞が ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ ﾗデｴWヴ a;Iデﾗヴゲが 
SWデWヴﾏｷﾐWゲ ｴW HW I;ゲデ ;ゲ デｴW けｪﾗﾗS I┣;ヴげ ┘ｴﾗ I;ﾐ けヮ┌デ デｴｷﾐｪゲ ヴｷｪｴデげ, if he can be made aware of 
┘ｴ;デげゲ HWWﾐ SﾗﾐW ｷﾐ ｴｷゲ ﾐ;ﾏW ふ‘ﾗHWヴデゲﾗﾐ ヲヰヱヱき ‘ﾗデｴ ヲヰヱΒぶく TｴW aﾗI┌s of blame following the 
GヴWﾐaWﾉﾉ デﾗ┘Wヴ HﾉﾗIﾆ aｷヴW ﾗa ヲヰヱΑ ｷﾐ LﾗﾐSﾗﾐ ┘;ゲが H┞ Iﾗﾐデヴ;ゲデが ゲ┞ゲデWﾏｷIき ; けヴ;SｷI;ﾉ ヴWIヴW;ﾐI┞げ ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W 
of inequality and neglect of the poor, concentrated upon the Prime Minister herself (Freudenberg 
1993). Official reaction was deemed totally inadequate in a context where she had been cast as 
hopelessly out of touch with the concerns of ordinary people in the recent general election. The 
tower block and デWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ｷゲゲ┌W ﾗa ｷデゲ W┝デWヴﾐ;ﾉ けIﾉ;SSｷﾐｪげ デｴ;デ ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘WS デｴW aｷヴWげゲ ヴ;ヮｷS ゲヮヴW;S were 
then cast as symbolic of social inequality, in a narrative successfully promoted by liberal newspapers 
and the opposition Labour Party. Significantly, the public inquiry that continues into 2018 has 
prioritised the claims and fate of victims and the bereaved, with their narratives opening 
proceedings. Widespread demands that blame be apportioned に including against the fire brigade 
itself に will prove difficult to reconcile with the technical fact-finding purpose that remains central to 
the inquiry process.  
These narratives have developed with the communication of news about environmental events to a 
wider public, in the process accounting for what has happened and indicating how the future might 
be different. This was not the case for ﾏﾗゲデ ﾗa ﾗ┌ヴ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞ ┘ｴWﾐ デｴW a;デW ﾗa デｴW けﾏ;ゲゲWゲげ ┘;ゲ ﾗa ﾉｷデデﾉW 
concern or interest other than as a military or manpower resource to be used and controlled. 
けEﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉげ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲ ┘WヴW ﾐﾗデ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ ｷﾐ ゲ┌Iｴ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗヴ ﾗヮWﾐ デﾗ 
amelioration, and the language and assumptions of risk did not exist. The explicit notion of 
けWﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヴｷゲﾆげ ｷゲ ; IﾗﾐデWﾏヮﾗヴ;ヴ┞が ヮﾗゲデ-┘;ヴ ヮｴWﾐﾗﾏWﾐﾗﾐ ﾗa ┘ｴ;デ ゲﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷゲデゲ デWヴﾏ けﾉ;デW 
ﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷデ┞げ ;ﾐS デｴW けヴｷゲﾆ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ ふBWIﾆ 1992). This can be indicated with Googleげゲ NGヴ;ﾏ ┗ｷW┘Wヴが 
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that counts references to terms in their vast digital archive of published works between 1500 and 
ヲヰヰΒく Gヴ;ヮｴｷI;ﾉﾉ┞が けWﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヴｷゲﾆげ ヴW┗W;ﾉゲ ; IﾗﾏヮﾉWデWﾉ┞ aﾉ;デ ﾉｷﾐW ﾗa デﾗﾗ aW┘ ヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ デﾗ ヴWｪｷゲデWヴ 
until 1967, and then a dramatic and consistent increasing curve, up until the 2000s. In The Times 
Sｷｪｷデ;ﾉ ;ヴIｴｷ┗Wが ゲデヴWデIｴｷﾐｪ H;Iﾆ デﾗ ヱΑΒヵが けWﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヴｷゲﾆげ ﾏ;ﾆWゲ ｷデゲ aｷヴゲデ ;ヮヮW;ヴ;ﾐIW ｷﾐ ヱΓΑンく Iﾐ 
the Guardian archive, there are negligible mentions in the decade of the 1940s, then 11 in the 
1950s, 53 in the 1960s, 560 in the 1970s, 1224 in the 1980s, and 2633 in the 1990s. Such indicators 
are crude, and events prior to this period may have been cast in different terms rather than 
necessarily ignored. At the same time, the conceptualisation ﾗa W┗Wﾐデゲ ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa けWﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデげ ;ﾐS 
けヴｷゲﾆげ SWﾐﾗデWゲ ;ﾐ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ W┗ﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ ;ゲ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲ Iﾗﾏｷﾐｪ デﾗ HW ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ Hﾗデｴ ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ ;ﾐS more 
systemic, and more potentially open to change に with the narratives themselves central to this 
process. 
Whilst itげs beyond the scope here to provide an elaborated history, we can schematically outline 
some key contours and moments where underlying shifts are revealed. A useful starting point - and 
counterpoint - are the classical ancient civilizations that first produced reflective and available 
;IIﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ﾗa けWﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉげ W┗Wﾐデゲく TｴWゲW ゲﾗIｷWデｷWゲ ﾉ;IﾆWS ; ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ﾗヴ W┗Wﾐ ┘ﾗヴS aﾗヴ ヴｷゲﾆく ISW;ゲ ﾗa 
fate and fortune can be considered their equivalents in societies far more vulnerable to impacts such 
as of disease, and lacking effective means for their management. In Ancient Rome, the masses were 
a;ﾏﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ ;ゲゲ┌;ｪWS デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ けHヴW;S ;ﾐS IｷヴI┌ゲWゲげ ;ﾐS aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ Iﾗﾐケ┌Wゲデが H┌デ ﾗデｴWヴ┘ｷゲW デｴWｷヴ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ 
found little public expression in a society dominated by an insulated military-aristocratic elite. There 
was, of course, no mass media and records largely for internal elite rather than public consumption. 
Toner (2013) analyses of accounts of major Roman events such as military defeats and mass disease 
outbreaks indicate how concern focused around their impact upon symbolic state buildings, military 
I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ ;ﾐSが ;Hﾗ┗W ;ﾉﾉが ヴWﾉｷｪｷﾗﾐき け‘ﾗﾏ;ﾐ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ;ヴW ﾏﾗゲデ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデWS ｷﾐ ┘ｴ;デ I;ﾐ HW ｪﾉW;ﾐWS aヴﾗﾏ 
the disasデWヴ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW ゲデ;デW ﾗa ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ｪﾗSゲげ ふTﾗﾐWヴ 2013: 128). He quantifies the focus of 
Roman accounts, noting that only a quarter attempt to give cause or define the breadth and impact 
of events, 16% consider the number of casualties, 6% mention rescue work and only 2% suggest 
social and economic consequences. Responsibility and even the fate of rulers in antiquity could be 
shaped by disaster, particularly military defeat, but this was more likely to be a question of their 
disfavour and unsuccessful management of relations with the gods than in the contemporary sense 
of political culpability for perceived neglect of public security.  
Societies have characteristically attempted to make some official sense of, frequently devastating, 
environmental impacts. In general terms, histories of disaster discern a pattern of increasing: 
けぐmanipulation of disaster experiences by those who were in a position to dominate the ways in 
which they were communicated, documented, and interpretedぐげ Tｴｷゲ ┘;ゲ ;IｴｷW┗WS デｴヴﾗ┌ｪh: 
けOfficial proclamations and religious sermons designed to give meaning to what happened and to 
channel peopleげs behaviour in the desired directionげが and, above all, けto re-establish orderげ ふJanku, 
Schenk and Mauelshagen 2012: 19). Historically, this remained an elite project as it was for the 
Romans, however, and one not willing or able to account for events in rationalist risk terms. It was 
only in the Renaissance that a more independent and scientific approach began to develop that was 
not concerned only with order, but understanding and even controlling nature. The secular study of 
W;ヴデｴケ┌;ﾆWゲ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴ けﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉげ W┗Wﾐデゲ HWｪ;ﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW ヱΒth Century and its defining moment the 
response to the Europe-wide devastation of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, for which the European 
intelligentsia sought a determinedly rational explanation even as official responses remained 
shrouded in the traditional terms of divine retribution.  
The development of media through which individuals sought to narratively alert society to future 
dangers developed in parallel to scientific advancement, in the early eighteenth century. Mairal 
(2011) identifies Daniel Defoe as a key figure in its emergence; regarded as the first English 
journalist, and an author we know as sensitive to misfortune and how even the lone individual might 
manage it, through his novel, Robinson Crusoe. But it was in his other, journalistic, work that Defoe 
is significant here. In his account of the Great Storm of 1703 he innovated bearing witness to events, 
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ｷﾐデWヴ┗ｷW┘ｷﾐｪ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲ ;ﾐS ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗ｷﾐｪぎ けﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW ﾗa デｷﾏWぐｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪ デWヴヴｷHﾉW 
HWｪｷﾐゲが デ;ﾆWゲ ヮﾉ;IW ;ﾐS デｴWﾐ ｴ;S ゲWヴｷﾗ┌ゲ IﾗﾐゲWケ┌WﾐIWゲげ (Mairal 2011: 70). Aゲﾆｷﾐｪ ┘ｴ┞ けデｴW ｪヴW;デ 
ゲデﾗヴﾏげ ｴ;ゲ ヮ;ゲゲWS ｷﾐデﾗ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ﾏWﾏﾗヴ┞が ; ヴWIWﾐデ reflection describeゲ DWaﾗWげゲ: けSWデ;ｷﾉWS ;ﾐS ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;ヴ 
;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ ┘ｴｷIｴ デ┌ヴﾐWS デｴW ゲデﾗヴﾏ ｷﾐデﾗ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげゲ aｷヴゲデ ┘W;デｴWヴ-ヴWﾉ;デWS ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴ ﾐW┘ゲ ゲデﾗヴ┞げ (Jones 2018). 
Whilst Defoe ┘;ゲ ゲデｷﾉﾉ ﾗa ｴｷゲ デｷﾏW ふゲWWｷﾐｪ け┘ｷﾐSゲ ;ゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾆゲ ﾗa ﾐ;デ┌ヴW H┞ GﾗSげぶ ｴW ヮﾗｷﾐデWS 
toward the future, compiling a list of terms - a けデable of degreesげ に to classify wind forces, at a time 
when meteorology barely existed. 
Defoe later turned his attention to another, quite different potential risk. Mairal identifies his, 
Journal of the Plague Year, of 1722, as the first journalistic narrative of risk, turning possibility into 
probability and uncertainty into risk by drawing upon past experience に in this case of an earlier 
disease outbreak. The journal employed a mixture of data and imaginative recreation as fictitious 
ﾏWﾏﾗｷヴ ふｴWげS ﾗﾐﾉ┞ HWWﾐ ; IｴｷﾉS ｷﾐ デｴW ヱヶヶヵ ヮﾉ;ｪ┌Wぶ デﾗ ┘;ヴﾐ デｴW ヮWﾗヮﾉW ﾗa LﾗﾐSﾗﾐ ﾗa ヴWﾐW┘WS 
imminent threat, linking past tragedy and future possibility. As well as the focus upon the future, 
DWaﾗWげゲ ┘ヴｷデｷﾐｪ ｷゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS デﾗ Iﾗﾐ┗ｷﾐIW デｴW ;┌SｷWﾐIW ｴｷゲ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ ｷゲ ;II┌ヴ;デW ;ﾐS H;ゲWS ┌ヮﾗﾐ W┝ヮWヴデ 
ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWく HW SﾗWゲ ﾐﾗデ ┌ゲW デｴW ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ﾗa けWﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヴｷゲﾆげが ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴが and impact remained 
limited before the age of mass media and a less deferential and more visible public. And it was only 
with new voices に more forceful than that of Defoe に prepared to contest official narratives, that 
they would begin to develop into a form recognizable today. 
In a further large historical jump, it is during the long Victorian period of the 19th Century that 
responses to the increasingly visible and extensive risk brought with industrialization became more 
urgent and secular, even as its victims remained invisible. Historians complain of over-simplified 
ヮｷIデ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa ヴｷゲﾆ ｷﾐ VｷIデﾗヴｷ;ﾐ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ ;ﾐS けIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉげ ﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷデ┞ ﾏﾗヴW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞が ;ゲ ﾗﾐW ﾏﾗヴW ;デ W;ゲW 
┘ｷデｴ ｷデ デｴ;ﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW けヴｷゲﾆ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げく Iﾐ a;Iデが ｷデ ┘;ゲ けaヴ;┌ｪｴデ ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾐ┝ｷWデｷWゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ ﾏﾗSWヴﾐization and its 
S;ﾐｪWヴゲが Hﾗデｴ ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉﾉ┞ ;ﾐS ﾉﾗI;ﾉﾉ┞げ ふM;ヴデｷﾐ ヲヰヱヴぎ ヴΓぶく Nonetheless, it was understood very differently 
to today and Martin (2014) notes the difficulty in identifying a consistent language of risk at all. 
Accidents were increasingly perceiveS ﾉWゲゲ ;ゲ け;Iデゲ ﾗa ｪﾗSげ H┌デ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ゲデｷﾉﾉ HW W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIWS a;デ;ﾉｷゲデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ 
without means of redress, limiting the development of narrative. Under these circumstances risk 
could even be enjoyed as spectacle rather than avoidable disaster. For example, in one of a series of 
London-based examples used here, the ship, the Princess Alice, sunk on the Thames in 1878 with the 
ﾉﾗゲゲ ﾗa ヶヰヰ ﾉｷ┗Wゲが H┌デ デｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗ ヮ┌HﾉｷI ｷﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ ;ﾐS デｴW ｷﾐケ┌Wゲデ Iﾗ┌ﾉSﾐげデ SWIｷSW ┘ｴｷIｴ ゲｴｷヮ ┘;ゲ デﾗ 
blame (Neal 1992, cited in Burgess 2011). The next day hundreds of onlookers went out on the 
AﾉｷIWげゲ ゲｷゲデWヴ ゲｴｷヮ デﾗ ゲWW デｴW Iヴ;ゲｴ ゲｷデW aﾗヴ デｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲが ;ヮヮ;ヴWﾐデﾉ┞ lacking any clear sense of another 
け;IIｷSWﾐデ ┘;ｷデｷﾐｪ デﾗ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐげく  
For those in authority, such accidents could be seen as simply the price to be paid (by others) for 
progress and, crucially, the responsibility of the individual rather than the corporation, state or free 
market system itself. Especially prior to the Railways Act of 1889, there were regular fatal train 
accidents, for example, mainly caused by the lack of basic organizational safety. Transport owners, 
nonetheless, typically refused to accept responsibility. For the Victorians, the problem was 
reconciling concern about accidents with any regulatory consequences (Hutter 2001). The principle 
of けself-ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ デｴW IﾗﾐS┌Iデ ﾗa ﾗ┌ヴ ;aa;ｷヴゲげ ┘;ゲ IWﾐデヴ;ﾉが ;ﾐS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ ;ﾐデｷデｴWデｷI;ﾉ デﾗ 
デｴW WﾐデヴWヮヴWﾐW┌ヴｷ;ﾉ ゲヮｷヴｷデ ;デ デｴW ｴW;ヴデ ﾗa Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげゲ ゲ┌IIWゲゲく TｴWゲW ;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ┘WヴW ; IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;HﾉW 
barrier to the development of wider risk narrative beyond simply holding an individual responsible, 
as was the likely fate of the Victorian train driver. More broadly, reaction to even large-scale public 
impacts remained subordinate to the national interest, determining an absence of narrative. The 
Silvertown munitions explosion of 1917 killed 73 and devastated a substantial section of the East 
end, but was marked only by a plaque, not a narrative (Neal 1992). It was deemed that investigation 
and publicity may have been damaging for wartime morale and any critical voices thus silenced, 
SWゲヮｷデW デｴW ﾗH┗ｷﾗ┌ゲ けﾉWゲゲﾗﾐ デﾗ HW ﾉW;ヴﾐデげ ﾗa ﾐﾗデ ゲｷデｷﾐｪ ﾏ┌ﾐｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ゲﾗ IﾉﾗゲW デﾗ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ IWﾐデヴWゲく 
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Crucial in determining change was the pressure generated by campaigning groups and individuals. 
Pioneering figures dedicated themselves to shaming the authorities into making safety 
improvements to the technologies of industrialization, articulating new narratives in the process. A 
fundamental problem was that most accidents involving significant casualties were of the poor, who 
scarcely figured in the attentions of Victorian society, driving the efforts of Charles Dickens and 
others. It is thus unsurprising that greater interest in accidents was often only catalysed by incidents 
ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗ｷﾐｪ けヴWゲヮWIデ;HﾉWげ ┗ｷIデｷﾏゲく TｴW ﾏ;ゲゲ Sヴowning in Regents Park during the Great Freeze of 1866-
7 caused uproar as the majority of victims were middle class, and no blame was assigned to the 
skaters by the media (Neal 1992). In rare cases the proximity of the respectable determined a story 
be told, such as the accident following the launch of the Albion cruiser in 1898. Whilst the 38 
onlookers killed were ordinary citizens, the presence of royalty meant the incident became a focus 
of national attention upon public safety at such occasions.  
More critical responses to accidents and environmental impacts began to develop piecemeal into 
the twentieth century but remained tempered by a still paternalistic culture. Even into the 1950s 
major events with major loss of life could be understood in uncritical terms, as was the case with the 
devastating floods of 1953. What is striking from a contemporary perspective is the lack of demand 
for institutional accountability expressed in media and public discussion, as if they were only a 
natural occurrence. The amplification of risk and accompanying narratives cannot develop without a 
aﾗI┌ゲ aﾗヴ ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Hﾉ;ﾏWが ｷﾐSｷI;デWS H┞ ｷデゲ ;HゲWﾐIW ｷﾐ I;ゲWゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ け;Iデゲ ﾗa ｪﾗSげ ﾉｷﾆW デｴW ┗ﾗﾉI;ﾐｷI 
ash cloud of 2010 (Burgess 2012). In so far as one can be identified, media narrative sought in 
reactions to the flood evidence of a continued community-┘ｷSW けHﾉｷデ┣ ゲヮｷヴｷデげ ;ﾏｷSゲデ デｴW HﾉW;ﾆﾐWゲゲ ﾗa 
post-war Britain (Toner 2013: 128). Such narratives illustrate how they can be wilfully constructed 
around an idealised, lost past, particularly in the continued absence of a forward-looking response 
more critical of authority. Hall (2011) argues this was actually the trigger point for a shift from 
;IIWヮデｷﾐｪ け;Iデゲ ﾗa ｪﾗSげ デﾗ ゲW;ヴIｴｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞が Sヴｷ┗Wﾐ H┞ デｴW ｪヴﾗ┘デｴ ﾗa ; デヴ┌ﾉ┞ ﾏ;ゲs media and 
the expansion of the middle classes. Subsequently, as revealed in responses to extreme weather 
W┗Wﾐデゲ ｷﾐ ヱΓΑΒが ヱΓΒΑ ;ﾐS ヲヰヰΑが H;ﾉﾉ ふヲヰヱヱぎ ヴヰヴぶ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデゲ ; ゲｴｷaデ aヴﾗﾏ けIﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデｷWゲ ﾗa ヴWゲｷﾉｷWﾐIW デﾗ 
an individualistic climate defined by vulnerabiliデ┞ ;ﾐS Hﾉ;ﾏWげく  
The cultural and political transformations of the 1960s stimulated the emergence of a less 
deferential, hierarchical and more public society, and less compliant media. Whilst socio-cultural 
changes provided the opportunity for a different kind of narrative and response, it would still require 
determined individuals and hard-fought battles to reconfigure framing. An important landmark, in 
the UK, in developing a more public narrative was the coal landslide which buried the village of 
Aberfan in Wales, including its school, with the loss of 144 lives in 1966が ヴWIﾗ┌ﾐデWS ｷﾐ デｴW けゲデﾗヴ┞げ 
account of Austin (1967). The Tribunal that followed can be regarded as the first contemporary 
public inquiry which resolutely set itself against any dismissal of the tragedy as a mere accident 
without cause or blame (Burgess 2011). The Inquiry was pushing against still unyielding and anti-
democratic authority personified by the Coal Board. They refused to initially even contemplate, let 
alone accept their responsibility for the landslide. Rather than accommodate this response, 
however, the inquiry was prepared to pursue and condemn the Coal Board in the strongest terms 
and echo the feelings of bereaved relatives - something deeply shocking at this time. According to 
デｴW ｷﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞げゲ a;ﾏﾗ┌ゲ SWゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐ that remains a powerful cultural memory in the Welsh community 
(Shipton 2016): 
The Aberfan disaster is a terrifying tale of bungling ineptitude by many men charged with 
tasks for which they were totally unfitted, of failure to heed clear warnings, and of total lack 
of direction from aboveげ.  
The report was only published in full against considerable pressures. A further public inquiry and 
accompanying critical media narrative in the following year. The Ely inquiry of 1967 into staff 
mistreatment of geriatric patients and the unresponsiveness of the Ministry of Health was the first 
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that although conducted in private, was opened to public and media scrutiny. Complaints about Ely 
were first aired through a letter in 1965 to The Times and, later, a damning booklet of testimonials 
and the News of the World newspaper lent their populist weight to the campaign (Burgess 2011). 
Further, in 1968, Harold Evans led his campaign as editor of the Sunday Times to expose the scandal 
ﾗa デｴW Sヴ┌ｪ デｴ;ﾉｷSﾗﾏｷSWが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｴW SWゲIヴｷHWS ;ゲ け; ヮｴ;ヴﾏ;IW┌デｷI;ﾉ ﾗ┌デヴ;ｪWくくくデｴ;デ ヴWﾏ;ｷﾐゲ デｴW 
ｪヴW;デWゲデ ﾏ;ﾐﾏ;SW Sｷゲ;ゲデWヴげ ふE┗;ﾐゲ ヲヰヱヴぎ ヱぶく Aデ ﾉW;ゲデ ｷﾐ デｴW UK, these developments remained partial 
and disconnected, however, and there was still no more consistent narrative of environmental risk, 
even as a more critical culture was emerging around single events and scandals ;ﾐS E┗;ﾐゲげ ヮヴWゲIｷWﾐデ 
ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ﾗa けﾏ;ﾐﾏ;SW Sｷゲ;ゲデWヴげく 
 
Into the に American - Risk Society and けMan-Madeげ Nuclear Catastrophism 
The ﾏﾗヴW aﾗヴﾏWS けWﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヴｷゲﾆげ ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W reflected in the NGram data above developed firstly 
in the United States, already a less deferential political culture where, from the 1960s, 
entrepreneurial and organised campaigns emerged around consumer and environmental rights, 
marking a new stage in the development of an American けrisk ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ (Mohun 2013). A new culture 
sensitive to environmental risk developed beyond single events and issues, described in the terms of 
Douglaゲ ;ﾐS WｷﾉS;┗ゲﾆ┞げゲ Iﾉ;ゲゲｷI ┘ﾗヴﾆ ふ1982) as a shift from one defined by the values of the 
デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ けIWﾐデヴWげ デﾗ デｴﾗゲW ﾗa ;ﾐ WﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ Iﾗ┌ﾐデWヴ-I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ けヮWヴｷヮｴWヴ┞げく The objects of risk were 
wide ranging; key examples of fluoride, cars, pesticides and radiation are focused upon here, but 
there are other important examples - such as water contamination, associated with the iconic figure 
of けﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞ ﾏﾗﾏげが Erin Brockovich. The subjects at risk of these new narratives, meanwhile, were 
both specific (particularly children) and unprecedentedly wide-ranging, suggesting threat not only to 
all, but even future generations. 
The new environmental and consumer narratives of the post-1960s were less familiarly anticipated 
by the contesting of the fluoridation of the water supply in the 1950s. There we see already a 
ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲWS H┞ I;┌ゲ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ H┌デ ;ﾉゲﾗ ; けヴｷゲﾆ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ デ┞ヮW IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ 
with possible future harm of incalculable scale, vigorously に even conspiratorially に ranged against 
an official narrative of necessary progress (Beck 1992). Yet, the anti-fluoride campaigning of the 
1950s tends to be forgotten as its populist, anti-state politics were quite different, even antithetical 
to the self-consciously counter-cultural character of successors; けデｴW ゲデヴ;ﾐｪW ヮヴﾗデWゲデゲ ﾗa デｴW ;ﾐデｷ-
aﾉ┌ﾗヴｷS;デｷﾗﾐｷゲデゲ ﾗa デｴW ヱΓヵヰゲ ゲWWﾏ ﾏ┌Iｴ ﾉWゲゲ ゲデヴ;ﾐｪW デﾗS;┞げが ;ゲ ﾗﾐW ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ ヮ┌デ ｷデ ふS;ヮﾗﾉゲﾆ┞ ヱΓΓヰぎ 
86). L;ヴｪWﾉ┞ SｷゲﾏｷゲゲWS H┞ デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲIｷWﾐIW ﾗa デｴW デｷﾏW ;ゲ ｷヴヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ けヮ┌HﾉｷI ;ﾉｷWﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげ, important 
elements and cｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲデｷIゲ ﾗa デｴW けヴｷゲﾆ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ デ┞ヮW ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ┘WヴW Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴWS, and the 
controversy still endures internationally.  
The post-war programme to put fluoride into the water supply reflected a still naive sense of 
ゲIｷWﾐデｷaｷI ﾗヮデｷﾏｷゲﾏ デｴ;デ ; けﾏ;ｪｷI H┌ﾉﾉWデげ Iﾗ┌ﾉS eliminate tooth decay (Carstairs 2015). Reaction was 
animated by a relatively distinctive American culture of suspicion of the federal state; of 
けW;ゲｴｷﾐｪデﾗﾐげ W┝デWﾐSｷﾐｪ ｷデゲ ヴW;Iｴ デﾗ ｷﾐデWヴaWヴW W┗Wﾐ ｷﾐ W┗Wヴ┞S;┞ ﾉｷaWく It was led by two physicians, 
Exner and Waldbott, lending evidential authority to their claims; the latter having conducted 
research into fluoride toxicity. Their major work, The American Fluoridation Experiment (Exner and 
Waldbott 1957), initiated the subsequently powerful narrative theme of the public being used as 
guinea pigs in an unnecessary scientific exercise. Published by a mainstream rather than academic 
press for maximum exposure, it was written in animated prose. Echoing contemporary 
precautionary arguments, they insisted research was needed into possible long-term health side-
effects, suggesting government-industry complicity in masking risk and expanding the reach of the 
state into public life. The risk of tooth decay was best addressed through reducing sugar 
consumption, in their view, but industry self-interest determined indiscriminate fluoridation.  
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In the mid-1950s Waldbott began the National Fluoridation News, a tabloid-ゲデ┞ﾉW ﾐW┘ゲヮ;ヮWヴが けデｴ;デ 
favoured conspiratorial headlines, shocking revelations of pro-fluoridation tactics, scathing 
SWﾐﾗ┌ﾐIWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa aﾉ┌ﾗヴｷSWげゲ S;ﾐｪWヴゲが ;ﾐS a┌ﾐﾐ┞ I;ヴデﾗﾗﾐゲげ (Carstairs 2015: 17). There is continuity 
ｴWヴW ┘ｷデｴ DWaﾗWげゲ ｷﾐデWﾐデ ﾗa ┘;ヴﾐｷﾐｪ デｴW ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐが H┌デ デｴW aﾗI┌ゲ ｷゲ ﾐﾗ┘ ┌ヮﾗﾐ ﾏ;ﾐ-made 
environmental risks and the complicity of authority in their spread. Waldbott further developed the 
anti-corporate narrative with the theme of the embattled David against the corporate Goliath in his 
recollection of: A Struggle With Titans: Forces Behind Fluoridation (1965).  
The development of risk narrative in the United States displayed organizational determination and 
flair, a self-conscious populism and a railing against the products and even ideology of science and 
progress. No individual was more adept at developing effective themes and tropes than the 
consumer and environmental campaigner, Ralph Nader. Also using the populist book format, his 
most well-known was, Unsafe at Any Speed (1965) which argued that individual responsibility for 
;IIｷSWﾐデゲ ┘;ゲ ｷヴヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ デﾗ デｴW a┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ ﾗa デｴW ;┌デﾗ ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞げゲ ヮヴｷﾗヴｷデｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Iﾗﾏaﾗヴデが 
and ultimately profits, over safety. Shockingly, American caヴゲ Iﾗﾐデ;ｷﾐWS けSWゲｷｪﾐWS-ｷﾐ S;ﾐｪWヴゲげが ;ゲ デｴW 
book was subtitled, in a further addition to the vocabulary of risk narrative. Nader added the theme 
of industry evading well known criticism that was to acquire far greater force with the connection of 
smoking anS I;ﾐIWヴ ヴW┗W;ﾉWS ｷﾐ デｴW ヱΓヶヴ S┌ヴｪWﾗﾐ GWﾐWヴ;ﾉげゲ ヴWヮﾗヴデく N;SWヴ ゲ┌HゲWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞ デﾗﾗﾆ ﾗﾐ ; 
wide range of consumer risk targets. Such was the impact of these new narratives that consumer 
protection from risk became a defining object of presidential policy and regulatory initiative under 
Lyndon Johnson and subsequent administrations. 
Arguably even more significant than Nader in the development of risk narrative に particularly in a 
more explicitly environmental form に is Rachel Carson, with her seminal and evocatively titled, Silent 
Spring (1962); a book again written for popular consumption through a mainstream publisher. The 
background was the emergence of a range of pollution-related issues such as smog and concern 
about the impact of former chemical sites, from the mid-1950s. And the spectre of the atomic bomb 
hung over Cold War America, symbolic for Carson of how the human relationship with nature had 
become dangerously imbalanced. Yetが ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wゲ ゲデｷﾉﾉ ゲヮﾗﾆW IﾗﾐaｷSWﾐデﾉ┞ ﾗa ｴﾗ┘ け┘;ヴゲげ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ 
けWﾐWﾏｷWゲげ ﾉike insects damaging crops could eradicate them, without any concern for consequences, 
such as from indiscriminate crop spraying.  
C;ヴゲﾗﾐげゲ Hﾗﾗﾆ ┘;ゲ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWﾐSWS ;ゲ ; けｪヴ;ﾐS ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wげ; an ecological defence of nature against 
human assault and arrogance, particularly the still-dominant faith of post-war America in science 
and human progress. An emphasis upon human health risk from chemicals was controversial and 
novel, and one she originally shied away from as insufficiently political or reforming (Lytle 2007). But 
Silent Spring evolved into a focus upon the use of pesticides on crops, particularly DDT, which she 
argued would けsilenceげ wildlife as well as affect human health. As with Nader and Waldbott, this was 
an attack also on industry itself who were accused of spreading disinformation, with the complicity 
of public officials.  
HWヴ ﾉｷデWヴ;ヴ┞ ゲデ┞ﾉW ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘WS Sヴ;ﾏ;デｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Sヴ┞ ゲIｷWﾐIWき デｴW aｷヴゲデ Iｴ;ヮデWヴが け; a;HﾉW aﾗヴ デﾗﾏﾗヴヴﾗ┘げ 
looked back nostalgically to a small-デﾗ┘ﾐ AﾏWヴｷI; けｷﾐ ｴ;ヴﾏﾗﾐ┞ ┘ｷデｴ ｷデゲ ゲ┌ヴヴﾗ┌ﾐSｷﾐｪゲげ ふC;ヴゲﾗﾐ ヱΓヶヲぎ 
1). Whilst remaining scientifically informed it was urgently and even luridly posed, with the most 
science-H;ゲWS Iｴ;ヮデWヴ ふンぶ S┌HHｷﾐｪ ゲ┞ﾐデｴWデｷI ヮWゲデｷIｷSWゲ けWﾉｷ┝ｷヴゲ ﾗa SW;デｴげ which marked an 
unprecedented stage of, and threat to, humanity. At the same, illustrating the practical orientation 
of her focus and campaigning of this time more generally, she advocated judicious use of pesticides 
rather than their outright ban. Silent Spring brought the environmental issue into the mainstream, 
reshaping the regulatory agenda. The book went on to sell over a million of copies in the face of 
furious industry opposition and its message and concerns shaped American policy-making, leading to 
the banning of DDT and the later creation of the Environmental Protection Agency.  
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Silent Spring left a considerable wider legacy, not least in popularising and politicising the distinction 
between the natural and the man-made and the scale of the dangers posed by けヮﾗﾉﾉ┌デｷﾐｪげ デｴｷゲ 
boundary. Whilst a distinction common to many cultures it was given contemporary force and a new 
science-based language of risk, directed towards the individual (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). The 
Europe-┘ｷSW I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ ｪWﾐWデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾏﾗSｷaｷWS けFヴ;ﾐﾆWﾐaﾗﾗSゲげ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ヱΓΓヰゲ SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デWS 
the continued power of this narrative, leading to its de-facto ban. At the same time, Zinn and 
MacDonald (2018) note that Silent Spring did not yet fully trigger intellectual engagement with risk 
language, at least in social studies, and tended to remain semantically disconnected. It would take 
something more dramatic and compelling than pesticides to fully animate discussion of a man-made 
environmental risk to humans directly. It was the threat posed by nuclear technology which had 
originally animated Carson that stimulated the sociological engagement with environmental risk 
from the early 1970s and more active public concern. Classic sociological texts explore the social 
construction of nuclear concern (Gamson and Modigliani 1989) that was to become the most 
powerful of risk stigmas (Edelstein 2001)く Wｴｷﾉゲデ ｷデげゲ ┘ヴﾗﾐｪ デﾗ ;Hゲﾗﾉ┌デWﾉ┞ Iﾗ┌ﾐデWヴ-pose the scale and 
nature of earlier hazards with those of the risk society, the narrative around these risks に including in 
BWIﾆげゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ ┘ヴｷデｷngs に represented a significant departure in the scale of projected harm and the 
independence of catastrophist narrative from evidence with which we began (Martin 2014). 
The partial reactor meltdown in 1979 at Three Mile Island spawned nationwide protests though no 
recorded human harm. Yet this was a single, dramatic event that portended the possibility of mass 
SWゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS SｷヴWIデﾉ┞ IﾗﾐﾐWIデWS デﾗ デｴW ┌ﾉデｷﾏ;デW けSヴW;Sげが ﾗa ヴ;Sｷ;デｷﾗﾐが ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSｷﾐｪ ｷﾏﾏWSｷ;I┞が 
imagery and untold speculation about effects. The catastrophist narrative connected an original folly 
of attempting to harness uncontrollable energy that was born of military imperatives with 
government and scientific complicity in corporate self-interest, played out in the drama of hapless 
technicians trying to contain disaster. E┞W┘ｷデﾐWゲゲが ヴWヮﾗヴデWヴゲげ ゲデﾗヴｷWゲ HWI;ﾏW ; ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ｪWﾐヴW 
aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デｴW ｷﾐIｷSWﾐデが ;ｪ;ｷﾐ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ デ;ヴｪWデWS Hﾗﾗﾆゲが ﾉｷﾆW デｴW けｴﾗ┌ヴ H┞ ｴﾗ┌ヴ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ ﾗa 
┘ｴ;デ ヴW;ﾉﾉ┞ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐWSげが ;ゲ SデWヮｴWﾐゲげ ┘ﾗヴﾆ ふヱΓΒヰぶ ┘;ゲ ゲ┌HデｷデﾉWSく Gヴ;┞ ;ﾐS ‘ﾗゲWﾐ (1982) was simply 
WﾐデｷデﾉWS けデｴW ┘;ヴﾐｷﾐｪげが ┘ｷデｴ ; aヴﾗﾐデ-ヮ;ｪW ヴWIﾗﾏﾏWﾐS;デｷﾗﾐ ;ゲ ﾉ;ヴｪW ;ゲ デｴW ;┌デｴﾗヴゲげ ﾐ;ﾏWゲが 
SWゲIヴｷHｷﾐｪぎ け; ヴｷヮヮｷﾐｪ デｴヴｷﾉﾉWヴ ﾏ;SW ﾏﾗヴW IﾗﾏヮWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ H┞ デｴW a;Iデ デｴ;デ ｷデ ｷゲ デヴ┌Wげく Aヴｪ┌;Hﾉ┞, the scope 
for narrative elaboration was encouraged by the lack of actual devastation such as at Hiroshima. And 
Three Mile Island remains a parable articulated through journalistic narrative, long after the event. 
The subsequent account of H;ﾏヮデﾗﾐ ふヲヰヰヱぶ ｷゲ ゲ┌HデｷデﾉWS ; けヴWヮﾗヴデWヴげゲ ゲデﾗヴ┞げ ﾗﾐ デｴｷゲ けヴ;IW ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ 
nuIﾉW;ヴ Sｷゲ;ゲデWヴげく A ┘WHゲｷデW SWSｷI;デWS デﾗ デｴW けﾏｷﾐ┌デW H┞ ﾏｷﾐ┌デW ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wげ ゲ┌ヴヴﾗ┌ﾐSｷﾐｪ デｴW ヮ;ヴデｷ;ﾉ 
meltdown remains available (Johnson). 
TｴW けﾉｷﾐｪWヴｷﾐｪ SヴW;Sげ ﾗa ヴ;Sｷ;デｷﾗﾐ Wﾐｪ;ｪWゲ Hﾗデｴ ヮゲ┞IｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉが けFヴ;ﾐﾆWﾐゲデWｷﾐｷ;ﾐげ aW;ヴゲ ｷﾐ 
a powerful script, triggered by nuclear accidents (Erikson 1991). In the subsequent, more significant, 
nuclear meltdowns at Chernobyl and Fukushima the actuality and even globalization of human 
catastrophe was widely and immediately assumed and continues to endure in the cultural 
imagination. On April 30, 1986, as the meltdown was confirmed by the USSR, lurid language was 
accompanied by specific death tolls, projected in time and space, framed around a narrative of 
catastrophism. The popular UK press on the day news emerged, mirroring others internationally, 
with Today SWIﾉ;ヴｷﾐｪ ; けﾐ┌IﾉW;ヴ ﾐｷｪｴデﾏ;ヴWげ ┘ｷデｴ け‘┌ゲゲｷ;ﾐゲ aﾉWWｷﾐｪ デｴW Iﾉﾗ┌S ﾗa SW;デｴげが デｴW Daily Mail 
;ﾐﾐﾗ┌ﾐIWS けヲヰヰヰ SW;S ｷﾐ ;デﾗﾏ ｴﾗヴヴﾗヴげが デｴW Express デｴ;デ けデｴW ﾐ┌IﾉW;ヴ ﾐｷｪｴデﾏ;ヴW ｷゲ ｴWヴWげ, repeating 
the claimed death tolﾉ aｷｪ┌ヴW ﾗa ヲヰヰヰが ;SSｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ けヱヰヰヰゲ ﾏﾗヴW ;ヴW SﾗﾗﾏWSげく Iﾐ ﾏﾗヴW ゲWヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ﾗ┌デﾉWデゲが 
デｴW G┌;ヴSｷ;ﾐげゲ ﾉW;SWヴ SWIﾉ;ヴWS け;ゲ Sｷゲ;ゲデWヴ ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ aヴﾗﾐデｷWヴゲげく IﾐデWﾉﾉWIデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞が デｴW ｷﾐIｷSWﾐデ ;aaｷヴﾏWS 
デｴW ヴW;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴW けヴｷゲﾆ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ ;ﾐS ｷデゲ Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ ﾗa an incalculable impact of man-made risk. Like with 
Three Mile Island, nuclear catastrophist narratives endure. 2018 saw the publication by a major 
ヮ┌HﾉｷゲｴWヴ ﾗa ;ﾐﾗデｴWヴ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa デｴW CｴWヴﾐﾗH┞ﾉ ﾐ┌IﾉW;ヴ ﾏWﾉデSﾗ┘ﾐき ヴW┗ｷW┘WS ;ゲ ｴﾗ┘ けE┌ヴﾗヮW nearly 
became uninhabit;HﾉWげ ふﾏ┞ ｷデ;ﾉゲ Pﾉﾗﾆｴ┞ ヲヰヱΒき BWWヴ ヲヰヱΒぶく Iデ ｷゲ ; ヮﾗヴデWﾐデﾗ┌ゲ デ;ﾉW ﾗa ┘ｴ;デ might have 
been constructed through a narrative set inside the reactor control room and the inability of staff to 
grasp the enormity of what was unfolding and react accordingly. 
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Away from and lacking narrative, the scientific assessment remains one of surprisingly limited 
ｷﾏヮ;Iデ W┗Wﾐ aヴﾗﾏ CｴWヴﾐﾗH┞ﾉく TｴW IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲ ﾗa デｴW CｴWヴﾐﾗH┞ﾉ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏ IﾗﾐIﾉ┌SWS ｷﾐ ｷデゲ けﾉ;ﾐSﾏ;ヴﾆ 
SｷｪWゲデ ヴWヮﾗヴデげ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾆ ﾗa ヶヰヰ ゲIｷWﾐデｷゲデゲ that fewer than 50 deaths were attributable to the 
accident, and there may be up to a further 4000 above average deaths attributable (WHO 2005). The 
area itself is now a natural wilderness. Unsurprisingly - in an age of competing sources of authority に 
others contest the statistics and alternative narratives do exist. A Russian account circulated via 
ヴ;SｷI;ﾉ ﾏWSｷ; Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ ; I;ゲ┌;ﾉデ┞ ヴ;デW ﾗa ;ﾉﾏﾗゲデ ; ﾏｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐが ;ﾉﾉWｪｷﾐｪ ; けIﾗヴヴ┌ヮデげ けIﾗ┗Wヴ ┌ヮげ H┞ デｴW WHO 
;ﾐS ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ｪWﾐIｷWゲが Sヴｷ┗Wﾐ H┞ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ デﾗ けヮヴﾗデWIデ デｴW ﾐ┌IﾉW;ヴ ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞げが in a classic 
contemporary conspiratorial narrative (Grossman 2013).  
A similar narrative of overwhelming radiation impacts followed the meltdown at Fukushima in 
Japan, caused by the tsunami in 2011. There were no direct deaths from radiation and the highly 
publicised increased levels of thyroid abnormalities and cancers are understood to have been the 
result of higher levels of screening (Pearce 2018). Meanwhile, 15,893 people were killed by the 
tsunami (Ritchie 2017). Despite being over 5 times the death toll from 9/11, the tsunami dead are 
ゲI;ヴIWﾉ┞ ヴWﾏWﾏHWヴWS ﾗ┌デゲｷSW J;ヮ;ﾐが デｴW ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ Sｷゲ;ゲデWヴ ﾉ;Iﾆｷﾐｪ けﾉｷﾐｪWヴｷﾐｪ SヴW;Sげ ;ﾐS ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗ｷﾐｪ ﾉWゲゲ 
obvious institutional blame than nuclear or terrorist risk. 
This is not to suggest there were not much wider human impacts following both incidents, but these 
should be understood in the context of the impact of debilitating narrative itself upon public and 
official reactions. TｴW ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW aｷヴゲデ ┘;ゲ ﾗa ﾗ┗Wヴ┘ｴWﾉﾏWS けCｴWヴﾐﾗH┞ﾉ ┗ｷIデｷﾏゲげが デｴ;デぎ 
けEﾐIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪWS ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲ デﾗ デｴｷﾐﾆ ﾗa デｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲ a;デ;ﾉｷゲデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ;ゲ ｷﾐ┗;ﾉｷSゲぐｴWﾉヮﾉWゲゲが ┘W;ﾆ ;ﾐS ﾉ;Iﾆｷﾐｪ 
Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉ ﾗ┗Wヴ デｴWｷヴ a┌デ┌ヴWげが ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ ゲ┌ヴ┗ｷ┗ﾗヴゲく Tｴｷゲ ｴ;ゲ ﾉWS WｷデｴWヴ デﾗ けﾗ┗Wヴ I;┌デｷﾗ┌ゲ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ ;ﾐS 
W┝;ｪｪWヴ;デWS ｴW;ﾉデｴ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐゲが ﾗヴ デﾗ ヴWIﾆﾉWゲゲ IﾗﾐS┌Iデげ ふCｴWヴﾐﾗH┞ﾉ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏ ヲヰ05). A significant psycho-
social impact also followed Fukushima (WHO 2013; Harada, et al 2015). In the absence of clear 
information putting risks into proportion, even medical and charity staff would not come to the 
Fukushima area to help (Pearce 2018). An estimated 1600 fatalities died after Fukushima due to 
evacuation and stress-induced causes, including suicide and alcoholism (Ritchie 2017)く PWﾗヮﾉW Sﾗﾐげデ 
want to return to the area, refusing to believe that exposure levels were insignificant. Attempts to 
explain how increases in health abnormalities result from increased screening interpreted as 
evidence of scientific collusion with the nuclear industry, following the narrative pattern (Pearce 
2018). Scientific meta studies of reactions meanwhile conclude that: けYWデ ;ﾉﾉ ﾗa デｴWゲW ;IIｷSWﾐデゲ ｴ;┗W 
one main feature in common: experts regard the consequent mental health impact as the largest 
ヮ┌HﾉｷI ｴW;ﾉデｴ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏげ (Takebayashi et al. 2017). The longer-term socio-psychological effects from 
fear of radiation woven into a fatalistic narrative of scientific and institutional failure needs 
addressing following such incidents (von Hippel 2011: 27). We have travelled from an invisibility of 
the victims of environmental risk to them becoming the central focus and, ironically, to arguably 
becoming the victims of narrative itself. 
 
Beyond Simple Blame Narrative 
A focus upon narrative is a useful addition to risk research, with its focus upon the language, content 
and associations of messages. A narrative focus also directs us to consider the predominant 
psychological and cultural biases that determine their impact rather than focus too much on hazards 
themselves. It also suggests greater emphasis upon the neglected historical dimension of risk 
research, reflecting upon the process of change in the sense we make of the risks around us. This 
article will hopefully stimulate further research into what is here only a general presentation, 
restricted to English language forms and focused on the US and UK - important as these examples 
appear to be in their international impact.  
This review has drawn out both continuity and change in the evolution of environmental risk 
narratives. They share an objective of bringing a risk object to the attention of an object at risk, that 
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is an increasingly wider public, with the intention that the narrative process may help prevent 
recurrence. The historical emphasis here is fitting as narratives themselves characteristically draw 
upon the past to anticipate the future, providing a tool to anticipate outcomes and shape responses, 
like the idea of probability itself. This occurs with a growing confidence that it is within our capacity 
to avoid what were earlier cast as inevitable events, using new empirical tools and information, 
brought to life through language. Whilst broader social changes and the development of a secular, 
science-based culture provide the opportunity for this to occur, narratives require individuals 
inclined to articulate them, and prepared to challenge existing assumptions and forces.  
They have played an important role in creating awareness of unrecognised or underestimated risks, 
from warnings of the imminence of long-forgotten plague to alerting us to the dangers of 
indiscriminate pesticide usage. Such a function remains significant in relation to issues such as 
climate change that remain publicly disconnected from both experience and knowledge and subject 
to counter-narrative. The empowering function of narratives is often historical, acting as an effective 
social memory, and has a role to play in destructive risk alarms such as over the childhood vaccine 
MMR, which led to plummeting rates of immunisation after the publication of a fraudulent research 
ヮ;ヮWヴ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデｷﾐｪ ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ ;┌デｷゲﾏが ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ; ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ﾗa ┌ﾐﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ けﾗ┗Wヴﾉﾗ;Sｷﾐｪげ デｴW 
immune system. Had an official counter-narrative reminding the public of the forgotten impact of 
ﾏW;ゲﾉWゲ HWWﾐ ﾏﾗヴW ゲ┌IIWゲゲa┌ﾉが デｴW ;ﾉ;ヴﾏげゲ ｷﾏヮact may have been more limited (Bedford 2004). 
The memory role of narrative is important in relation to scandals and tragedies in which authority is 
complicit and seek to downplay. Whilst now rarer in countries such as the UK where the culture of 
responsibility has been transformed since Victorian times, they do still occur and can be shaped by 
similar class prejudices, particularly against stigmatized groups. For example, it was only through a 
ﾉﾗﾐｪ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ ﾉWS H┞ a;ﾏｷﾉ┞ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲ デｴ;デ けﾃ┌ゲデｷIW aﾗヴ デｴW Γヶげ Liverpool football club supporters 
crushed to death at the Hillsborough stadium disaster in 1989 was achieved, and acknowledgement 
;ﾐS ;ヮﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ aﾗヴ デｴW ヮﾗﾉｷIWげゲ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ I;┌ゲｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS Iﾗ┗Wヴｷﾐｪ ┌ヮ デｴW Sｷゲ;ゲデWヴ Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴWS. TｴW け┗ﾗｷIWゲげ of 
the tragedy and bereaved are captured in several narrative accounts (e.g. Sampson 2016).  
At the same time, the nature and culpability for such events is typically less clear than in cases such 
as Hillsborough, Aberfan and thalidomide, even if the predominant cultural script is that they are a 
norm. And the dramatically posed and polarised nature of many narratives bears little scrutiny. 
PWゲデｷIｷSWゲ ;ヴW ﾐﾗデ けWﾉｷ┝ｷヴゲ ﾗa SW;デｴげ ;ﾐS ヴ;Sｷ;デｷﾗﾐ IﾗﾏWゲ ｷﾐ ﾏ;ﾐ┞ aﾗヴﾏゲ - including the naturally 
occurring and as an effective cancer treatment - and is by no means synonymous with human 
catastrophe. Uncertainty and contestation are the truer norm of environmental risk issues; the 
effectiveness and desirability of the fluoridation of the water supply with which our post-war story 
began remains unresolved, for example. 
But there are also important differences in the nature of narratives, as they evolved. Among others, 
DWaﾗWげゲ W;ヴﾉ┞ ┘;ヴﾐｷﾐｪゲ SｷS ﾐﾗデ ;デデWﾏヮデ デﾗ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ;ゲゲｷｪﾐ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞が ;ﾏｷSゲデ ﾐﾗ W┝ヮWIデ;デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ 
this could be worthwhile. This only changed more systematically amidst a more visible and less 
deferential public, and greater expectation of equal treatment and redress as a more combative 
media and civil society pushed against entrenched institutional denial of responsibility, 
characteristically in specific cases where this was clear, and harms demonstrable. More fully formed 
environmental risk narrative develops firstly in the United States where the notion of systemic and 
man-made manufactured risk linked to progress first emerges, most fully in relation to nuclear 
accidents. Targets then tend to become wider than single institutions and failures, as does an 
assumption of complicity, even conspiracy of the range of scientific, political and corporate 
authority. In a crude sense the demand for responsibility and accountability passes into blame, 
though the boundaries remain unclear. 
The narrative themes of originally American environmental risk narrative are no longer particular to 
it. What was once a radical counter-cultural, anti-corporate narrative suspicious of science has been 
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universalised and become mainstream. In the process, narratives formed around single, scandalous 
events such as the exposure of the harms of tobacco in the 1960s - and how industry sought to 
create uncertainty around known harms - have become a narrative template assumed to have wider 
application. At its core is the routinisation of the idea that something once naively assumed to be an 
everyday, innocent pleasure will turn out to be a deadly risk, previously masked by corporate greed, 
institutional collusion and scientific inertia. There have been various iterations of the narrative 
デヴﾗヮWが けデｴW ﾐW┘っﾐW┝デ ゲﾏﾗﾆｷﾐｪっデﾗH;IIﾗげが ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ﾏﾗゲデ ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ I┌ヴヴWﾐデ デ;ヴｪWデゲ HWｷﾐｪ ゲ┌ｪ;ヴ ;ﾐS 
meat (e.g. Malhotra 2016; Charlebois 2018). The language of risk here is really that of only danger 
signalling complete avoidance (Douglas 1994). 
Risk narratives today continue to alert us to danger, but in circumstances where these are less clear, 
and calculations involve complex issues of considering alternatives and managing unintended 
consequences. The simplicity and stark posing of blame characteristic of dominant contemporary 
risk narrative are not easily suited to the complex task of communicating risk within which interest in 
narrative has emerged. Risk communication in a world facing impacts such as of climate change also 
involves the difficult task of encouraging recognition and even the acceptance of risk at the heart of 
risk management, without simple blame. If narrative is to be used as another risk communication 
tool it needs to be more sophisticated and targeted. As Sellnow et al (2018) conclude in their 
reflection on the use of narrative for communicating emerging disease riskぎ け;ﾐ Waaective crisis 
narrative should focus not only on what protective actions to take, but also on a clear explanation 
regarding the nature of the crisis. Moreover, such explanations must be translated intelligibly to 
diverse non-scientific publics and provide a compelling rationale for why the recommended actions 
;ヴW ┗ｷデ;ﾉくげ  
In the important case of nuclear reactions discussed here, a narrative of resilience, or even simply 
calm, rather than risk would be more empowering. It seems appropriate to end with a story. 
Shunichi Yamashita is dean of the Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences at Nagasaki University, 
whoげゲ devoted his life to understanding the impact of nuclear incidents upon survivors, from 
Nagasaki onwards. His knowledge was used by local authorities after Fukushima and in creating a 
survey of the 150,000 evacuees. But he became a public pariah because of his contesting of 
けヴ;SｷﾗヮｴﾗHｷ;げ ;ﾐS ;ﾐ けWヮｷSWﾏｷI ﾗa aW;ヴげが デｴW message that this was as much an information as nuclear 
disaster and his optimistic statements on radiation exposures - even advising people to smile and 
relax, as part of a positive coping strategy (Yamashita 2017). The subject of conspiratorial accusation 
and derogatory nicknames such as ‘damashita’ (who tricked), he was forced to resign as head of the 
survey in 2013 and remains marginalised. Sending clear and positive messages is difficult and even 
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